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THE SALE-OF-CONTROL QUANDARY
David C. Baynet
Building on his custodial concept of corporate control and the resultant theory
of the "contrbleur" as a strict trustee, the author endeavors to demonstrate
by an analysis of three recent New York opinions that the legality of any
transfer of corporate control is ultimately founded on the suitability-intellectual, moral, managerial, social, physical-of the successor "contrbleur."
In reachinghis conclusion the author first recognizes the legitimacy of control
tenure by mere incumbency (in contradistinction to a corporate-democratic,
majority-vote tenure) and then considers various indicia of "contrOleur" unsuitability which might illegitimate any transfer of control to such a "contrOleur."

The New York courts in the early 'sixties have asked the very questions
most conducive to a practical body of law for the regulation of the transfer of corporate control. The answers to the problems posed in the Essex
2 and Republic3 cases should produce a set
Universal,' Caplan-Lionel,
of major transfer-of-control rules, which inductively will constitute in
turn a philosophy of the transfer of control.4
The principles implicit in the transfer of control are as important as any
in the entire philosophy of control,5 and as elusive as they are important.
t David C. Bayne, S.J.: A.B. 1939, University of Detroit; MA. 1946, Loyola University
of Chicago; LL.B. 1947, LL.M. 1948, Georgetown University; J.S.D. 1949, Yale University;
S.T.L. 1953, West Baden College. Member, District of Columbia, Michigan, and Missouri
Bars. Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 There are two distinct Lionel cases. The first, Caplan, was an action to set aside the
election of Lionel directors. Matter of Caplan (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No.
24, p. 14, col. 3 (Feb. 4, 1964) (Schweitzer, J.) (reported as Matter of Lionel Corp.), aff'd
sub nom. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't 1964),
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877. All three courts agreed that
the election was illegal. The second case, Gabriel, was a derivative action to recover for
Lionel the premium received by Defiance Industries, Inc. in the transfer of control. Gabriel
Indus., Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 119,
p. 13, col. 8 (June 17, 1964) (Serafite, J. ), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 630, 257 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st
Dep't 1965). The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment was granted.
3 Matter of Carter (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 103, p. 17, col. 1 (May
26, 1964) (Korn, J.), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 543, 261 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st Dep't 1964).
4 This present article is the ad hoc application of the philosophy of the transfer of corporate control evolved in a companion study, Bayne, "The Sale of Corporate Control," 33
Fordham L. Rev. 583 (1965). Some advance in thinking since The Sale of Corporate Control will show itself in the limited area of the role of the premium. This resulted from the
preparation of The Sale-of-Control Premium, scheduled for early publication. See also Andrews, "The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares," 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 505 (1965); Berle, "Control in Corporate Law," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1958); Berle,
"The Price of Power-Are There New Overtones," 50 Cornell L.Q. 628 (1965); Hill, "The
Sale of Controlling Shares," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957); Javaras, "Equal Opportunity in
the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews," 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420
(1965); Jennings, "Trading in Corporate Control," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956).
5 The reasoning in both these companion articles, moreover, is essentially dependent on:
Bayne, "A Philosophy of Corporate Control," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963) (which has since
seen some development, particularly in the matter of transfer of control); Bayne, "Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee," 53 Geo. L.J. 543 (1965). These studies provide citations
to the principal commentaries in the field.
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Judge Friendly, concurring in Essex Universal, could well have been
speaking for every jurisdiction, all corporations and all stockholders:
"Here we are forced to decide a question of New York law, of enormous
importance to all New York corporations and their stockholders, on
which there is hardly enough New York authority for a really informed
prediction ....I'l Judge Clark, also concurring, faced up to the present
quandary of both courts and commentators.
But particularly in view of our lack of knowledge of corporate realities and
the current standards of business morality, I should.., hope... the record
will be generally more instructive on this important issue than it now is.
I share all the doubts and questions stated by my brothers in their opinions
and perhaps have some additional ones of my own. My concern is lest we
may be announcing abstract moral principles which have little validity in
daily business practice....7
The attempt here will be a resolution of "the doubts and questions"
beclouding the transfer of control. The approach will be ad hoc, with a
minimum of "abstract moral principles which have little validity in daily
business practice." Since the chronological is also the logical, (I) Essex
Universal, (II) Caplan-Lionel,and (III) Republic will be analyzed in that
order. The congeries of conclusions should give a practical pattern of
predictability for future transfer of control.
I
EssEx

UNIVERSAL CoRP. V. YATES

In mid-1957; Herbert J. Yates was president and chairman of Republic
Pictures Corporation (predecessor in name and adversity to Republic
Corporation) and owned 28.3 per cent of its voting stock. Essex Universal Corporation (controlling various diversified businesses) negotiated a contract with Yates for the sale of his interest at a price "roughly
two dollars above the then market price on the Exchange"--a $2,000,000plus premium. As in Caplan-Lioneland Republic, the transfer of control
was to be effected by the seriatim resignation of eight of the fourteen
Republic Pictures directors.9
As events would have it, Yates repudiated the contract for purportedly
good reason, and litigation ensued at the instance of Essex for damages
for the breach.
The district court rendered summary judgment for Yates. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed. Although Yates had raised other defenses,
6 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 1, at 580.
7 Id. at 579-80.
8 Id. at 573.
9 Id. at 574.
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the motion narrowed the issue to the one question. "Despite the disagreement evidenced by the diversity of our opinions, my brethren and I agree
that such a provision does not on its face render the contract illegal and
unenforceable ....,,10 This is the sum of the court's opinion.

The remand had a twofold purpose: to consider Yates's other defenses
and to try "the question of the legality of the contested provision .... :
[Wlhether a contract for the sale of 28.3 per cent of the stock of a corporation is, under New York law, invalid as against public policy solely
because it includes a clause giving the purchaser an option to require a
majority of the existing directors to replace themselves, by a process of
seriatim resignation with a majority designated by the purchaser."'"
The circuit court opinion is a curious amalgam. There are in fact four
opinions, the court's and three individual concurrences by Chief Judge
Lumbard and Judges Clark and Friendly. About the only point of stated
unanimity was the unqualified conclusion of per se legality-and the
remand. Beyond this, a patchwork of the three will serve as the "opinion"
of the Second Circuit. This synthesis of the court's "opinion" will be
followed by an analysis of its major holdings.
For all their avowed differences, patient scrutiny reveals surprising
accord, especially in reaching the decisive point of law. A summary syllogism will serve as an outline of the central argument of the "opinion."
The bare sale of office is illegal.
But the sale is bare only if (in violation of two postulates of "corporate
democracy"):
(1) The sale is not supported by the consent of the appropriators, 12 and
(2) The consent of the appropriators is not gained by the vote of sufficient stock-but only a majority consent is sufficient.
But a majority is present:
(1) Clearly with 50-- per cent stock, and
(2) Equivalently with 28.3 per cent.
Therefore, the sale is legal.
In this reasoning all three concurred, with only minor variations.
10 Id. at 573.
1
1
12

Ibid.
As the philosophy of corporate control has become increasingly more refined, the need
has become correspondingly pressing for an advanced technical lexicon to meet the demand
for the subtle distinctions of this complex field. Such a lexicon was submitted for general
acceptance in Bayne, "The Definition of Corporate Control," 9 St. Louis UL.J. 444 (1965).
Four principal terms of art emerged from that presentation. One of these is "appropriator"
-an owner who has entrusted, appropriated his asset into the custody of another. An
appropriator has the continuing "right" to the control and dominion of his asset, but has
ceded the actual "exercise" of that dominion. In contradistinction, an "owner" in control
argot has not only the right to the dominion but has retained the exercise as well. The
person, natural or legal, to whom the appropriator has entrusted his asset is the "controleur"
who thereby has complete custody, but has the right to the custody only by sufferance of
the appropriator. "Custody" and "appropriation" are also canonized words of art. Although
the use of this technical terminology may distract at first, its utility, even necessity, will
soon be apparent.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 51

The progress of the opinion may be traced through three stages: Corporate Democracy: Consent of the Appropriators, Corporate Democracy:
Majority Consent, and Majority Without a Majority.
CorporateDemocracy: Consent of the Appropriators
The three judges were somewhat reluctant to declare any sale per se
illegal, but New York precedents were too forthright. Chief Judge Lumbard, however, hastened to mitigate the harshness of the general rule of
illegality by a qualifying definition.
It is established beyond question under New York law that it is illegal
to sell corporate office or management control by itself (that is, accompanied
by no stock or insufficient stock to carry voting control). McClure v.
Law ....is

On first blush this qualification seems muddled. Judge Lumbard apparently said two things: (1) the sale of control is obviously illegal
without any concomitant sale of stock whatsoever, but (2) even if some
stock passes, the sale is still illegal as long as that stock is not enough
to carry voting control. Thus, the phrase "accompanied by no stock"
seems superfluous and could mislead. "No stock" is necessarily "insufficient" stock to carry voting control. Thus Judge Lumbard in effect said
only one thing: the sale of office is illegal if the control is unaccompanied
by sufficient stock for voting control.
The exact meaning of this one statement remains partially cloudy in
the early stages of the "opinion," yet it is undoubtedly the germinal
statement of the central holding. In his next comment, however, Judge
Lumbard, with the implicit concurrence of his confreres, moves toward
the crystallization of the controlling principle underlying this first statement, and the holding. He couched this primary postulate of their principal argument in terms of corporate democracy.
The rationale of the rule is undisputable: persons enjoying management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders, and therefore may
not regard it as their own personal property to dispose of as they wish
[footnote of the court]. Any other rule would violate the most fundamental
principle of corporate democracy, that management must represent and be
chosen by, or at least with the consent of those who own the corporation. 14
Without noticeable adversion, Judge Lumbard has blended together
two extremely important-and diametrically different-concepts: (1)
it is "the most fundamental principle of corporate democracy, that
management [as contr6leur] must represent . . . those who own the
corporation"--"must hold . .. [control] on behalf of the corporation's
18 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
14 Ibid.
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stockholders . . ." (2) It is also "the most fundamental principle of
corporate democracy, that management [as contr~leur] must . . . be
chosen by, or at least with the consent of, those who own the corporation."
The presence of the first of these principles-under the aegis of corporate democracy-increases the cloudiness of the early opinion. Strictly,
corporate democracy is foreign to this first principle. Judge Lumbard,
without visible objection, has stated an age-old axiom of property tenure:
the custodian of another's goods is invariably accountable to the appropriator for his stewardship and must direct his entire management of the
property to the benefit of the appropriator 5 and not to his own interest.
Thus "management control [the contr6leur]" must "hold it on behalf of
the corporation's stockholders," must "represent" the appropriators.
Further, this accountability extends to the transfer of the office itself. The
incumbent contr~leurs "must not regard it as their own ... to dispose of
as they wish." Management may never legally transfer control without
reference to the rights and interests of the appropriators.
This elemental principle of the contr~leur's accountability to the appropriator is not mentioned again in the "opinion." To what extent it influences the holding can only be conjectured. It is, however, integral to the
later analysis of this article. From this point forward the argument
narrows to the second of the two so-called principles of corporate
democracy. This principle is manifestly the primary postulate of the
central argument.
Undoubtedly the crux of the Essex Universal "opinion" lies here, in
the major reliance the three judges placed on this primary postulate: the
contr6leur "must be chosen by, or at least with the consent of," the
appropriators. This is the meaning of the initial requisite of sufficient
stock to carry the vote. The stock passing at the time of the transfer must
be in large enough quantity "to carry voting control." Captiously one
could argue that the phrase does not signify, without more, that the democratic vote of the ownership is the sole determinant of the legality of the
transfer. Stock ownership, plus other nondemocratic factors, could "carry"
voting control. But the three did not mean this. To them corporate democracy meant at least that the democratic consent of the appropriators is
essential to a legitimate transfer. Absent this principle and any transfer is

illegal.
But thus far the three have left the meanings of "voting control" and
"corporate democracy" incomplete. This voting control may be transferred only when supported by the democratic vote of a large enough
15 For the first known use of "appropriator" as a technical term, see Lepaulle, "An Out-

sider's Viewpoint of the Nature of Trusts," 14 Cornell L.Q. 52 (1928).
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block of stock. But how much stock? Sufficient stock. How much is suffident?
CorporateDemocracy: Majority Consent
The answer to the query of sufficiency comes in the second postulate in
the court's syllogism: The only sufficient appropriators' approval is a
majority approval.
Judge Lumbard introduces the development of this thesis gingerly by
an a fortiori statement: "Such stock voting control would incontestably
belong to the owner of the majority of the voting stock .

. . ."'

Only as

the three judges develop their reasoning-hence, pro tem, it must be
accepted ex arguendo-isit certain that they posit majority ownership of
the voting stock-over 50 per cent-as the chief, perhaps sole, requisite
for a legitimate transfer of that control.
Presumably Judge Clark was expressing this thought when he said
(citing McClure) that "New York law may render unlawful an agreement for the naked transfer of corporate office ' 17 and Judge Lumbard
later with the words: "a bare sale of office."' The bareness and the
nakedness, therefore, consist in (1) a sale effected by anything other
than the democratic consent of the appropriators, and (2) less than a
majority approval of that democratic vote.
Judges Lumbard and Clark are somewhat reticent. Not so Judge
Friendly. 9 He carries his notion of corporate democracy and majority
stock ownership to a rigid and conservative extreme.
Hence, I am inclined to think that if I were sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals, I would hold a provision like Paragraph 6 violative of
public policy save when it was entirely plain that a new election would
be a mere formality-i. e., when the seller owned more than 50% of the
stock. 20
At this point the court (except Judge Friendly, as New York) is faced
with a dilemma. The sale by Yates with only 28.3 per cent is legal on its
face. Yet the legality of the transfer depends on the democratic vote and
majority approval. What to do?
16 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 13, at 575.
17 Id. at 580.
18 Id. at 577.
19 Judge Friendly will appear to be talking out of both sides of his mouth. Rather he
first expressed his own reasoning and then reluctantly adhered to New York law. He showed
palpable exasperation with counsel who "were primarily devoted to argument as to what
the New York law has been rather than what it ought to be." Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,
305 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1962). Thus, judge Friendly could find nothing illegal under
New York law, and yet personally argue for illegality in the absence of 50% of the stock.
20 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Majority Without a Majority
The third of the three major propositions of the "opinion"-and a
remarkable conclusion as well-lies in judge Lumbard's resolution of the
dilemma, concurred in by Judges Clark and Friendly (as New York).
Essex was, however, contracting with Yates for the purchase of a very
substantial percentage of Republic stock. If, by virtue of the voting power
carried by this stock, it could have elected a majority of the board of
directors, then the contract was not a simple agreement for the sale of office
to one having no ownership interest in the corporation .... Such stock

voting control would incontestably belong to the owner of a majority of the
voting stock, and it is commonly known that equivalent power usually
accrues to the owner of 28.3% of the stock. [italics added] For the pur-

poses of this analysis, I shall assume that Essex was contracting to acquire
a majority of the Republic stock, deferring consideration of the situation
where, as here, only 28.3% is to be acquired. 1
Judge Lumbard would not admit that this was a departure from his
position. He thus remains true to his dual thesis of (1) control founded
only in the consent of the appropriators and (2) the majority consent of
those appropriators, but squeezes Yates under the fence with only 28.3
per cent by equating "a practical certainty ' 22 with majority certainty.
Thus something less than fifty per cent may be tantamount to majority
stock ownership and thereby satisfy the demands of corporate democracy
and majority consent. Judge Clark echoes Judge Lumbard: "Surely in
the normal course of events a management which has behind it 28.3 per
cent of the stock has working control .....
judge Friendly (as New
York) went a step further:
Although Barnes v. Brown . . .dealt with the sale of a majority interest

[and approved the sale], I am unable to find any real indication that the
doctrine there announced has been thus limited [to "majority" instances].
True, there are New York cases saying that the sale of corporate offices is
forbidden; but the New York decisions do not tell us what this means and
I can find nothing... to indicate that New York would not apply Barnes
v. Brown [and thus attribute legality] to a case where a stockholder with
much less than a majority conditioned a sale on his causing the resignation
of a majority of the directors and the election of the purchaser's nominees. 24
[Emphasis added.]
Query how much of a step further is Judge Friendly's "much less than a
majority" than the "equivalent power" of Judges Lumbard and Clark. No
at 575.
= Id. at 579. "If Essex was contracting to acquire what in reality would be equivalent
to ownership of a majority of stock, i. e., ifit would as a practical certainty have been
guaranteed of the stock voting power to choose a majority of the directors of Republic in
due course, there is no reason why the contract should not similarly be legal."
21 Id.

23 Id. at 580.
24 Id. at 582.
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one of the three defines the requisites for legitimacy when less than a
majority or sets the lowest limit which would still be sufficient. Nor do
they explain, beyond the mere statement, why a lesser amount is tantamount to a majority. Nor most of all, do they reconcile it with a democratic consent of the appropriators.
Only the conclusion to the syllogism now remained. The group agreed
on the three principal points supporting the unadorned holding of legality:
the bare sale of office is illegal, but the sale is bare only if violative of the
twofold stipulation of corporate democracy: (1) the voting control being
transferred must be founded on the consent (and accompanied by the
sale) of stock ownership (not some other basis for control) and (2) that
consent of stock ownership must be a majority-over fifty per cent. But
"28 .3 per cent of the voting stock.., is usually tantamount to majority

control."25 In Essex Universalthe voting control is 28.3 per cent. The conclusion: therefore the transfer is legal.
With their principal thesis established the judges proceeded to dispose
of any possible obstacles to their central holding.
The Presumption of Legality
Judge Lumbard, without comment from his associates, carried the
reasoning of legality to an understandable presumption.
Because 28.3 per cent of the voting stock of a publicly owned corporation
is usually tantamount to majority control, I would place the burden of proof
on this issue on Yates as the party attacking the legality of the transaction.
Thus, unless on remand Yates chooses to raise the question whether the
block of stock in question carried the equivalent of majority control, it
is my view that the trial court should regard the contract as legal and should
proceed to consider the other issues raised by the pleadings 26
Without any other illegalities in rebuttal, this majority-ownership presumption will prevail.
The Premium Question
The remainder of the "opinion" revolved around the possible impact of
the $2,000,000 premium passing from Essex to Yates. Judge Lumbard,
again without supporting comment, began with a general rule:
There is no question of the right of a controlling shareholder under New
York law normally to derive a premium from the sale of a controlling block
of stock. In other words, there was no impropriety per se in the fact that
Yates was to receive more
per share than the generally prevailing market
price for Republic stock. 27
25
26
27

Id. at 579.
Ibid.
Id. at 576.
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Seemingly the judge first raised and then dismissed the premium question
as preliminary to the consideration of other possible irregularities which
would vitiate the transfer. More likely, however, his later references to
the commonplace sale-of-control frauds are exceptions to his general premium rule, that is, instances where a premium was not proper.
In either case, Judge Lumbard next proceeds to cases of clearly illegal
sales, where the contr6leur "may be compelled to account to the corporation for that part of the consideration received by them which exceeds the
fair value of the block of stock sold, as well as for the injury which they
may cause to the corporation." 8 Here the judge instances the familiar
looting cases, Gerdes 9 and Insuranshares.0 In both, the court hands
over the premium to all the shareholders. He mentions another possible
exception, Perlman v. Feldmann."' However, here Judge Lumbard found
no "illegitimate activity on the part of the purchasers."" - The illegality
lay with the sellers who "had appropriated to their personal benefit a
corporate asset"8 8 which belonged equally to all.
Judge Clark added two other possible illegal activities which presumably would frustrate the presumption of legality. "[T]here is no
evidence at this stage that the vendor's power to transfer control of the
'
board was to be secured unlawfully, as, for example, by bribe or duress."84
Judge Lumbard summarizes the premium question:
A fair generalization from these cases may be that a holder of corporate
control will not, as a fiduciary, be permitted to profit from facilitating
actions on the part of the purchasers of control which are detrimental to the
interests of the corporation or the remaining shareholders. There is, however,
no suggestion that the transfer of control over Republic to Essex carried
any such threat to the interests of the corporation or its other shareholders.3 5
Thus, absent any "profit from facilitating actions... detrimental" to the
corporation, any premium is legitimate and does not overturn the major
presumption of legality established by majority stock ownership (or its
equivalent).
The two million dollar premium in Essex, since it did not correspond to
any of the classes of illegal premiums, did not vitiate the deal.
Only Judge Friendly embarked on a theory peculiar to himself. Not
only is majority ownership the sole norm of legality, but no exceptions are
28 Ibid.

29 Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
80 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (EDl. Pa. 1940).
31 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 952 (1955).
82 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
a8 Ibid.
84 Id. at 580.

5 Id. at 576.
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permissible in the form of lesser percentages "equivalent to" majority
ownership.:
I have no doubt that many contracts, drawn by competent and responsible
counsel, for the purchase of blocks of stock from interests thought to
"control" a corporation although owning less than a majority, have contained provisions like Paragraph 6 of the contract sub judice. However,
developments over the past decades seem to me to show that such a clause
violates basic principles of corporate democracy .... This seems to me a
wrong to the corporation and the other stockholders which the law ought
not countenance, whether the selling stockholder has received a premium
or not ....
Hence, I am inclined to think that if I were sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals, I would hold a provision like Paragraph 6 violative of
public policy save when it was entirely plain that a new election would
be a mere formality-i.e., when the seller owned more than 50% of the
stock. 36
Judge Friendly would not rely on other illegalities-looting, appropriation
of corporate assets, bribery, duress-but would declare, without more,
any transfer of control illegal unless the purchaser commanded over fifty
per cent of the voting stock.
This is the "opinion" in Essex Universal. With such surprising concurrence, one would wonder why the four opinions.
What is to 'be said of the court's reasoning, its conclusions, and the
principles implicit throughout?
Essex Universal Analyzed
By building on the four opinions, by distinguishing and refining, some
new insights into the working principles underlying the transfer of control
should eventuate. Certainly no dissent can be directed to the sole official
act of the court. The unexplained and unqualified pronouncement of
the per se legality is unassailable. (This is a dangerous statement, however, and wants expatiation.) Since the opinion itself went no further, any
commentary must revolve around the three concurring opinions.
The court cleared the ground early with an oft-overlooked distinction.
Wherein lies the alleged illegality? In the (1) payment of a premium, or
the (2) transfer itself? At every stage of the way the "opinion" made it
manifest that any-if any-illegality lay not in the bonus paid for the
transfer but in the transfer of the office itself. The premium question was
for granted; or for elsewhere. (But even this was not fully true of Judge
Friendly, pro per.)
(1)

The Nature of the Sale

Although the judges skirted the point frequently, with glimmerings
here and intimations there, no forthright statement described the trans86 Id. at 581.
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action as merely one particular type of the many methods of the transfer
of corporate control. Nor did the three go the next step and reduce the
transfer to the selection and appointment of a successor to the incumbent
contrbleur.
Judge Lumbard seemed to credit Judge Fxiendly with such penetration
when he alluded to Judge Friendly's pretermission of: "any contention
that control could not be safely transferred to the particular purchaser
....
.,,7 Yet Judge Lumbard himself described the object of sale as personalty, not simply as the occupancy of an office. "[P]ersons enjoying
management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders,
and therefore may not regard it as their own personal property to dispose
of as they wish."38 This is undoubtedly a lapsus linguae because Judge
Lumbard later expressed the true nature of the transaction when he
quoted Judge Earl in Barnes v. Brown: "'It was simply the mode of
transferring the control of the corporation to those who by the policy of
'I" When Judge Friendly warned the sharethe law ought to have it....'
holders that on some occasions they would- "have no voice as to ...[the
contrbleur's] immediate successor,"4 he correctly described the transfer
in terms of the selection of a new man for the office.
Only the realization of the true nature of the transaction-essentially
the selection and appointment of a new contrleur-makes any sense out
of the intricacies of the transfer of corporate control.
(2) The Fiduciary Duty of the Appointment
All three judges (Judge Clark's brevity, however, leaves much between
the lines) enunciated the contr~leur's broad fiduciary duty to corporation
and shareholders. But they did not specify that duty into its major objectives: (1) the erection of the best possible corporate structure; (2) the
employment of the most enlightened managerial policy; (3) the selection
of the most competent personnel. 1 Nor did they acknowledge (although
almost) the selection of a successor as the contr~leur's chief act, albeit his
last, toward fulfillment of this third subduty.
A fair generalization from these cases may be that a holder of corporate
control will not, as a fiduciary, be permitted to profit from facilitating
actions on the part of the purchasers of control which are detrimental to
the interests of the corporation or the remaining shareholders.4 2
Implicitly, the facilitation of "actions on the part of the purchasers of
control" would include preeminently the first and chief facilitation of
87

Id. at 573.

38 Id. at 57S.
89 Id. at 577.
40 Id. at 581.
41 See Bayne, "A Philosophy of Corporate Control," supra note 5, at 43.
42 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
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any and every action of a purchaser, his appointment to the office. But
Judge Lumbard is far from a conscious inclusion of the appointment
itself among those "facilitating actions" which are regulated by the norms
of the contr6leur's duty.
However, the all-important reasoning at the base of the contr6leur's
broad fiduciary duty, and the nexus between that duty and its ad hoc
application to the selection and appointment of a purchaser of the office,
can be constructed, at times with difficulty, from the four opinions.
Custody-the Immediate Foundation.As amorphous as the corpus of
his fiduciary duty of control may be, Judge Lumbard approaches parlously close to the rationalization of the prime essential of that duty: the
custodial relationship existing between contr6leur and corporation. Here
is that age-old axiom of property tenure which Judge Lumbard introduced
early in his opinion, never to raise again. "[P]ersons enjoying management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders .... ""
This could scarcely be called an endorsement of the custody theory of
corporate control.44 Yet the word "hold" is exactly expressive of custodial
tenure. Strictly, management does not hold control. Management, as
contr6leur, holds the corporation. The shareholders, as appropriators,
have entrusted the entire corporation with all its assets into the custody of
the contr6leur. The contr6leur, in acquiescing to this stewardship, receives and accepts absolute dominion over the entity, with all the obligations consequent on that dominion. Custody is the immediate foundation of the fiduciary duty.
Next, Judge Lumbard's phrase "on behalf of" is not only redolent of
the strict trust but is again exactly expressive of the second essentialsecond to and flowing from the custody--of the fiduciary duty: the
benefit-to-beneficiary rule: every thought, word, and action must redound to the good of corporation and shareholders. Judge Lumbard
bolsters this analysis with the insistence "that management must represent.. , those who own the corporation."4 5
Ownership-the Ultimate Foundation. An important factor in the
solution of the problem of Essex lies in the exact delineation of the manifold role of the appropriators in the transfer. Here the "opinion"' had the
answer in its neglected principle of property tenure: control must be
founded on ownership. As the custody of the corporation is the proximate
foundation of the contr6leur's fiduciary duty, so ownership (as the
foundation of custody) is the ultimate.
43 Id. at 575.

44 The custody theory of corporate control is delineated in detail in Bayne, "Corporate
Control as a Strict Trustee," supra note S.
45 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 42, at 575.
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The contrSleur as custodian of the appropriator's property must trace
any rights whatsoever back to him. The owner at the outset, by definition,
possesses complete dominion of his assets. They are his to dispose of as
he wishes. Only he may appropriate them into the stewardship of another.
No one else may say who is to be appointed in his place. This is elemental.
Once appointed, the contr6leur as steward holds the assets for and on
behalf of the appropriator. Any rights in the steward flow from and are
in virtue of ownership. In this sense, the contr6leur acts "on behalf of"
and must "represent" the appropriator, "may not regard... [the control
as his] own personal property to dispose of as" he wishes. Every act of
the contr6leur must be in the best interests of the appropriators-stockholders.
But the owner's exercise of the right and duty to appoint his contr6leur
ceases with the initial appointment. The very essence of the concept of
control places the right-or at least the duty-of successive appointments
in the incumbent contr6leur. At the heart of New York's problem is this
fundamental postulate of the modern control phenomenon: the invariable
separation of control from ownership. One may have custody only over
another's assets.
Once appointed initially by ownership the legitimate incumbent assumes all the obligations of the office, the chief of which and the last is
the appointment of his own successor if need be. The contr6leur either
relinquishes dominion or performs the duties. The appropriator on his
part either reasserts control (which may be morally imperative at times),
if possible (and the control hypothesis thereby collapses, as does the
question of the transfer, or leaves control in the hands of the contr6leur
with the duty of naming a successor.
But the initial assumption may be illegitimate. By duress, blackmail, or duplicity, a contr6leur may wrest dominion from a helpless
appropriator. However, even though this initial appropriation was forced
and involuntary, the illicit contrbleur is nonetheless incumbent, has
nonetheless acquiesced in the custody by his usurpation and his continued refusal to return dominion to the appropriator and hence has at
least the duty, although not the right, to meet the demands of the office
and choose a successor.
Thus both legitimate and illegitimate incumbents hold their office in
the right of the ownership of the appropriator. Both possess the duty to
appoint by virtue of the ownership. Thus control is ultimately founded on
stock ownership in each and any case.
Ownership, then, is the foundation of the contr6leur's fiduciary duty,
both in general, the bonum commune of the corporation, and specifically,
pursuant to the third subduty, the naming of a successor.
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The Duty to Appoint. Only implicitly, therefore, did the "opinion"

subject the appointment of the contr6leur to the broad fiduciary duty of
the corporate bonum commune. Further, it had difficulty in realizing
that this third subduty of the contr6leur's fiduciary duty had a double
aspect: (1) the actual right or duty to appoint, and (2) the suitability of
the selection. In failing to distinguish the far-reaching results separating
these two markedly distinct aspects, the court fell into the first, in logical
sequence, of five major pitfalls in its path. The court virtually ignored the
question of the appointee's suitability and seemingly assumed that if
the incumbent contr6leur had the duty to appoint, the qualifications of his
appointee were of no concern. True, the norms for both flow from the
contr8leur's custody, are founded in ownership, and in this sense may
be treated as one, but there the parity ends.
Bear in mind, therefore, that the court is never clear-cut in distinguishing the duty to appoint from the competency of the appointee. Any
logical discussion, however, must sever these distinct concepts. The first
consideration must be the duty to appoint. The suitability is for later.
At this point the argument reaches the crux. Whence the power to
appoint? What is the source of the capacity to name a new contr8leur?
What is the foundation for the appointment? What are the various types
of power bases-legitimate and illegitimate-on which the contr6leur
founds his custodial tenure?
In answering this focal question, the three judges placed their exclusive reliance on corporate democracy as the sole determinative of the
legitimacy of the appointment (irrespective of the qualifications of the
person named). Thereby, the court encountered the second major pitfall
of the "opinion": the misconception that corporate democratic consent
is the only legitimate power base for the contr6leur's position. According to the court, this legitimacy may be viewed from two aspects which
come to the same thing: (1) an incumbent contr~leur whose tenure is
unsupported by the consent of the appropriators-shareholders has no
right to name a successor to the office of contrbleur and (2) a successor
contr~leur who did not receive the approval of the appropriators is
illegally appointed. In other words, to judges Lumbard, Clark, and
Friendly every transfer of control is illegal without the concomitant democratic consent of the appropriators-shareholders. Undeniably, here is the
core of New York's problem and the source of "the doubts and questions"
facing the courts.
No doubt motivated by strong predilections for corporate democracy,
the court, especially Judge Friendly, immediately fell into the third pitfall (an understandable excess of their consent-of-ownership postulate):
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not merely is consent of ownership the sole legitimate basis for control,
but this consent must be majority consent.
The arguments against subjecting the contr6leur to the approval of
anyone, including the appropriators, in the appointment of his successor
are, however, a fortiori in the case of a majority-approval prerequisite.
Since bare consent and majority consent are subject to the same frailties,
they can be considered together, in conjunction with an analysis of the
various sources, legitimate and illegitimate, of the contr6leur's power to
control.
The Power Bases of the Custody. Judge Lumbard and the court were
correct in their conviction that control is founded in ownership. But it
would be ruinous to limit that foundation and the source of control solely
to a democratic, majority approval by ownership. Majority consent is
only the one of five such power bases.
On the rare occasions when the contr6leur has illegitimately seized
control, the power base of his control position can range the gamut
from subtle fraud to "duress" 46 or outright blackmail. For present purposes this type of power base has relevancy only toward a full treatment
of the various methods of gaining and retaining control tenure.
The least complex and most obvious genesis of the control relation
is verified when a one-hundred per cent owner entrusts the entire entity
into the custody of a contr6leur. The legal formulae for such an appropriation are varied, e.g., a proxy, a voting trust, a formal trust. Patently, totalownership appropriation is thoroughly consonant with the court's double
postulate of corporate democracy, not only consent but majority consent
of ownership.
When the ownership distribution is less than one-hundred per cent in
one person but more than fifty, the exigencies of corporate life and the
need for some leadership give the seal of approval to a control position
founded on simple democratic rule by majority. Here is the sole solution
in the eyes of the court to the problem of the legitimacy of the contr6leur's tenure, the only licit power base.
(3)

Mere Incumbency v. Democracy

The most notable present-day phenomenon of corporate life is the fateful junction of the wide dispersal of shares with the modern mechanics
of solicitation (control of the proxy statement, corporate finances, personnel). This fortuitous combination has entrusted to management by incumbency alone an absolute and total custody of the corporation. Even
a one-hundred per cent owner can give no greater dominion.
46 Id. at 580.
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Thus, incumbency control is necessarily founded on ownership. The
initial accession to control may have been legitimate. The gradual and
often imperceptible dispersal of shares may have occurred with the
conscious or unconscious consent of the owners. Or the initial assumption may have been illegitimate. No matter, the contr6leur is nonetheless
incumbent, nonetheless a custodian, and hence nonetheless burdened
with the fiduciary duty to appoint a successor, in accordance with the
interests of ownership, should conditions so demand.
Mere incumbency control expresses itself in an infinity of variations
(thereby providing the fourth and fifth of the five power bases) stretching from: the A.T.&T. type in which a single appropriator never approaches more than one or two per cent ownership, to tenuous incumbency control in which a large (but short of fifty per cent) block founds
its control position on the wide dispersal of, say, a ten to twenty per cent
segment but is also faced with a sizable opposition block. Query whether
any difference in kind separates these antipodal extremes. In both cases
the rubber-stamp minority appropriators are fully incapacitated by the
paucity of corporate information and the inability to utilize what little
they get. Both factors are referable to the stock dispersal and the solicitation system.
The Yates control position is founded on a simple variant of just such
a mere-incumbency tenure. The 28.3 per cent block formed a convenient
base, true, but ultimately Yates stood or fell on his ability to write the
proxy statement. Further, nothing in the facts indicates that his accession
to control was illegitimate. Yates held the purse strings, the personnel,
and the machinery. The dispersal of 1.5 million shares in the hands of
4,700 shareholders did the rest. Yates had acquiesced to the stewardship,
whether legitimately or illegitimately.
Neither of the two major postulates, one in effect, of "corporate democracy" proposed by the court-(i) consent of ownership, and (2) majority
approval-may be posited of the tenure of a mere-incumbency contrbleur.
Neither in the A.T.&T. nor the Yates type do the appropriators have
any, let alone majority, voice in corporate government, and hence in
selecting a successor contr6leur. Nor, as has been seen, should they. The
basic assumption in the entire philosophy of control is the total separation
of ownership from control.
In short, the concepts of appropriator and contr~leur are mutually
exclusive. In this marked respect fudge Lumbard and the court hedged
in their implicit support of the custodial concept. judge Lumbard never
quite releases the corporation to the full dominion of the contr6leur.
At the very moment that he speaks of management holding control and
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representing the appropriators he places control back in the hands of the
appropriators-a contradiction in concepts. When the crucial time comes
for the contr61eur to select a successor, the contr6leur ceases to be in
control and the appropriators become the contr6leur. The incoming
contr6leur must "be chosen -by,or at least with the consent of, those who
own the corporation."
The consent of the appropriators is, by hypothesis, the very Ithing the
contr6leur need never seek. The essence of his obligation as the chief
steward of the entity is the exercise of independent, unfettered judgment.
He is the ultimate power in the policy-making hierarchy. Counsel, advice, yes. But his must be the final decision, else he is not the contr61eur.
Compulsory consultation in such selection-approval or consent of the
appropriator-destroys the contr6leur's dominion, is essentially repugnant
to the twofold hypothesis of the control concept: that control is (1)
separated from ownership and (2) the ultimate power in the corporation.
But, note well, do not confuse consent of the appropriatorwith accountability to the appropriator.A custodian must refer every act-especially
his last and most important-to the best interests of the beneficiary, the
appropriator. Incontestably control is founded on ownership and must
consult the bonum commune of the corporation at all times. The benefitto-beneficiary rule is the first major conclusion from the custodial concept.
The three judges sensed all this. Yet no one of them carried forward
to a declaration of the legitimacy of a mere-incumbency contrbleur, and
consequently of any appointment made by him. The first hedge in their
stand appeared in the endeavor to mitigate the harshness of their majority-ownership rule. All three were prepared (except Judge Friendly, pro
per) to equate "tantamount" (Judge Lumbard) and "working control"
(Judge Clark) and "much less than" (Judge Friendly, as New York)
with the strict fifty-plus-per-cent majority of their initial stipulation.
Thus, in trying to step around the third pitfall, the strict-majority requisite-and perhaps subconsciously the second, consent of ownership
-the "opinion" walked squarely into the fourth. When the basis of
the approval is ownership consent, less than and "much less than" are
by no means "equivalent" to fifty-plus-per-cent stock ownership. When
the basis is share dispersal and the solicitation system, no ownership at
all is requisite. Then, no stock whatsoever is "the equivalent of majority
control." Only on this basis is it true to say that "it is commonly known
that equivalent power usually accrues to the owner of 28.3% of the
stock." The foundation for "that equivalent power" is neither the
majority vote nor the consent of stock ownership, but the solicitation
system and the dispersal of shares.
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It matters not how much or how little stock would be "usually tantamount to majority control" or would "in the normal course of events"
carry "working control" or be "much less than a majority." Thus the
labored attempts to equate 28.3 per cent with a true majority were unneeded from the outset.
Ironically the three opinions are peppered with intimations that this
less-than-majority control is in fact founded on mere incumbency, unrelated to any postulates of corporate democracy. Judge Clark, who had
the least to say on the matter, related Yates's control to the proxy
machinery: "Surely in the normal course of events a management which
has behind it 28.3 per cent of the stock has working control, absent
perhaps a pitched proxy battle which might unseat it.""7 Antecedent to
such "pitched proxy battle" the incumbent contr~leur owes his position
to the wide dispersal of shares. Until unseated, the contr6leur's dominion
is absolute, even though threatened, and fully dependent on his domination of the proxy statement. The threat of a proxy fight does not
minimize the contr~leur's absolutism. A successful fight merely changes
one mere-incumbency contr6leur for another.
Judge Lumbard came close to a description of the mechanics of incumbency control:
If Yates chooses to raise the issue [whether "28.3 per cent ...

is usually

tantamount to majority control"], it will, on my view, be necessary for him
to prove the existence of circumstances which would have prevented Essex
from electing a majority of the Republic board of directors in due course.
It will not be enough for Yates to raise merely hypothetical possibilities of
opposition by the other Republic shareholders to Essex' assumption of
management control. Rather, it will be necessary for him to show that,
assuming neutrality on the part of the retiring management, there was at
the time some concretely foreseeable reason why Essex' wishes would not
have prevailed in shareholder voting held in due course. In other words, I
would require him to show that there was at the time of the contract some
other organized block of stock of sufficient size to outvote the block Essex
was buying, or else some circumstance making it likely that enough of the
holders of the remaining Republic stock would band together to keep Essex
from control. 48
"[A]ssuming neutrality on the part of the retiring management" is
probably the key phrase in this analysis. Judge Lumbard meant that
control of the solicitation carried control of the corporation. Thus if
"retiring management" decided to welsh on the deal, the stock ownership of Essex and the democratic vote would come to naught. "Neutrality"
must be translated "partiality" if Essex, even with the 28.3 per cent
block, is to gain control. If Yates, still incumbent but without his 28.3
47
48

Ibid.
Id. at 579.
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per cent, presents a third "management" slate in the proxy, the stock
ownership and the democratic vote would avail Essex nothing even with
its 28.3 per cent block.
Domination of the proxy statement, not a democratic majority or
consent, makes it un-"likely that enough of the holders of the remaining
Republic stock [the dispersed shares] would band together to keep Essex
from control."
Of the three, Judge Friendly best understood that the incoming
contr6leur's tenure:
will depend not merely on the proportion of the stock held by the seller but
on many other factors-whether the other stock is widely or closely held,
how much of it is in "street names," what success the corporation has experienced, how far its dividend policies have satisfied its stockholders, the
identity of the purchasers, the presence or absence of cumulative voting,
and many others. Often, unless the seller has nearly 50%o of the stock,
whether he has "working control" can be determined only by an election;
groups who thought- they49 had such control have experienced unpleasant
surprises in recent years.
Judge Friendly acknowledged, in the face of a genuine need ("death,
incapacity or other hazard may prevent a director from serving a full
term"5"), the legitimacy of some mere-incumbency appointments, when
the owners "will have no voice as to . . . [the contr6leur's] immediate
successor."'51 But inexplicably he would not extend legitimacy to the
other commonplace mere-incumbency types, A.T.& T. and Yates.
Again, at another point, Judge Lumbard seemed to be placing the
efficacy of the "equivalent power" on the mere dispersal of shares:
Although in the case at bar only 28.3 per cent was involved, it is commonly
known that a person or group owning so large a percentage of the voting
stock of a corporation which, like Republic, has at least the 1,500 shareholders normally requisite to listing on the New York Stock Exchange,
is almost certain to have share control as a practical matter.52
This is no other than mere-incumbency control. The central 28.3 per
cent might facilitate the matter, but ultimately control is founded on
the sheepishness of the remaining appropriators. With this the court
rested. By concluding that 28.3 per cent was tantamount to majority,
the legality of Yates's transfer to Essex was proven. The Yates defense
of per se illegality thereby fell. The remand was designed only to confirm the fact of the equivalent power of the 28.3 per cent, and dispose
of other possible defenses.
49

Id. at 582.

50 Id. at 581.
51 Ibid.
52

Id. at 579.
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At this point, however, the court should not have rested. True, Yates
had a fiduciary duty to appoint his successor, not because the majority
or equivalent of ownership approved in a democratic election, but because
Yates through his mere-incumbency, wholly nondemocratic control had
assumed custody of Republic, but this is a far cry from an unqualified
approbation of the suitability of the appointee for the office. It is one
thing to have the right or duty to appoint and another to select the proper
man for the job.
The court undoubtedly knew this, but never carried through with a
judicial inquiry into the qualifications of Essex Universal for the position
of contr6leur of Republic. Perhaps this was a matter for the remand.
Had Essex Universal been egregiously unqualified, certainly this would
have elicited a marked adversion by the court to its suitability, in spite
of the incumbent contr6leur's right to appoint it.
This present analysis of Essex Universal, however, demands that that
inquiry into the suitability of the appointee be carried through. Judge
Friendly certainly moved the reasoning to the threshold of such an inquiry. Seemingly he made the junction between the broad fiduciary duty,
the bonum commune of the corporation, and the lesser subdivision of
that duty, the selection of a successor, even though he did not advance
beyond the general statement: "But the stockholders are entitled to
expect that... the remaining directors will fill the vacancy in the exercise
of their fiduciary responsibility."53 Judge Friendly clearly recognized
that the heart of the transfer was the choice of a man for the job, and that
this choice must be regulated by fiducial norms.
These fiducial norms governing the selection of the successor to the
contr6leur should form the foundation for any adjudication on the legality of the transfer of control.
(4) The Proximate Norms
The breakdown of the contr6leur's obligation in the choice of a successor into its (1) intellectual, (2) moral, (3) managerial, (4) social
and (5) physical components was understandably not the deliberate
concern of the court. Yet, consistent with the philosophy of the "opinion,"
these proximate norms of successor suitability can be partially discerned
throughout. Although judges Lumbard and Friendly were far from employing the five norms nominatim, they related the legality of the transfer
to the character deficiencies of the appointee. Judge Lumbard referred
to "circumstances of the sale [which] put them [the outgoing controleur]
on notice of the buyers' evil intentions" and later "to persons whose
5S

Id. at 581.
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intentions they had reason to suspect . . . . "4 Judge Friendly was concerned over the lack of "any consideration of the character of the latter's

nominees .... ",
At this point, Judge Lumbard correctly introduced a major presumption (although he founded it on incomplete grounds):
whenever the incumbent contr6leur bases his position on majority stock
ownership, the rebuttable presumption arises that his selection of a successor has satisfied the fivefold norms of character suitability.
"I would place the burden of proof on this issue on Yates as the party
attacking the legality of the transaction.... [T]he trial court should regard the contract as legal and proceed to consider the other issues .... MG
Judge Lumbard's presumption of propriety is sound, but the foundation
of the presumption on majority stock ownership alone (or stock ownership "tantamount to majority control ' 57 ) is incomplete. Any incumbent
contr6leur, either legitimate or unchallenged illegitimate, pursuant to his
duty to appoint a successor, should be accorded the same presumption.
Whether the contr6leur founds his tenure on (1) majority approval; (2)
total-ownership appointment, or (3) mere incumbency, the assumption
should be that he is exercising good judgment in his selection until the
contrary is judicially proven. This presumption, however, is rebuttable
and established guidelines aid in mounting the rebuttal.
(5)

The Indicia of Breach

Throughout their opinions Judges Lumbard and Friendly recurred
regularly to certain telltale instances-they did not call them indicia of
appointee unsuitability-where the outgoing contr~leur should have been
put on notice that his choice of a man for his job was a poor one, that
the selection of such a successor was either intentionally or negligently
violative of his fiduciary duty. The indicia of a breach of the proximate
norms, and the failure of the presumption of suitability, were no wise
exhaustive, but they got the point across.
Predictable Spoliation. Citing Gerdes,5" Judge Lumbard established
the intention to loot the corporation as a prime indicium of an appointee's
unsuitability to lead the company. "[T]hecourt required the sellers to
account [to the corporation, for the premium] on the theory that the
circumstances of the sale put them on notice o~f the buyers' evil intentions.)
54

59

Id. at 576, 577.

55 Id. at 581.
56 Id. at 579.

Ibid.
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
59 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
57
58

CORNVELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 51

Self-Serving Contracts. An incoming contr6leur is suspect if his avowed
or provable motives are inconsistent with the bonum commune of the
corporation. The Wilport syndicate, incoming contr~leur in Perlman v.
0 alerted incumbent Feldmann
Feldmann,"
of skullduggery by its readiness
to hand over a $1.3 million premium (which the court held belonged to
all equally) for the sale of control. The syndicate wanted, as the new
contr6leur, to award itself steel contracts without paying the legal, although gray-market, bonus. Although Judge Lumbard saw "an absence
of illegitimate activity on the part of the"'" syndicate, either the illicit
premium or the intent to pay no bonus seems to be some indication of
such moral laxity as to impugn the syndicate's suitability to run the firm.
But regardless of Judge Lumbard's estimate of the activity in Feldmann,
proof of self-serving contracts should induce close scrutiny of the appointee.
Fraud and Duress. Judge Clark instanced a bald indicium: "[T]he
vendor's power to transfer control of the board was [not] to be secured
'' 62
unlawfully, as, for example, by... duress.
The Appointee's Character.Strictly, all indicia point to the appointee's
character. But a separate category serves admirably to segregate the
gross evidences, i.e., fraud, looting, duress, from the less tangible, personal deficiencies, e.g., a proclivity to gambling or alcohol, social, or
physical ineptitude. Judge Friendly insisted on the "consideration of the
character of the ....nominees . ..."'
These indicia, extracted somewhat forcibly from the Essex Universal
opinions, are at best only examples of many another sign of an unqualified
appointee, and hence an illegal appointment.
The final and by far most important indicium demands separate
,consideration.
(6)

The Role of the Premium

Judges Lumbard and Friendly were faced with a dilemma. New York
law was clear. A premium was not per se improper. Yet, with varying
degrees of perspicacity, both judges understood that the premium was
a prime indicator of possible present and future wrongdoing, that such
wrongdoing was inevitably a human activity, and that the principal
human involved was the incoming contr8leur.
60 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), cert.
349 U.S. 952 (1955).
I1

Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 59, at 576.

62 Id. at 580.
63 Id. at 581.

denied,

1965]

THE SALE-OF-CONTROL QUANDARY

In the looting cases, Gerdes64 and Insuranshares,5 the court ordered
the premium paid over to the corporation. Judge Lumbard was cognizant
that here at least the premium was connected with the wrongdoingand hence unsuitability-of the incoming contr6leur. "[T]he court required the sellers to account on the theory that the circumstances of the
sale put them on notice of the buyers' evil intentions."6 6 In such gross
instances the premium is only one presage of the incoming contr6leur's
future conduct. The amount of the premium figured further in Judge
Lumbard's thinking.
The court found the price paid grossly in excess of the calculable fair value
of a controlling interest in the corporation, and found the differential to be
payment for the immediate control which, foreseeably, the67buyers used
to the detriment of the corporation and its other shareholders.
Judge Lumbard becomes more explicit later in his opinion:
The payment of a large premium for resigning (alleged to be $800,000 in
Benson v. Braun) is of course, relevant to the question whether the sellers
had any reason for suspecting
that the purchasers had improper intentions
68
in acquiring control.
Judge Lumbard not only designates the premium as an indicium of
chicanery but relates the chicanery directly to the purchasers.
Judge Friendly was more manifest. He even seems implicitly to maintain that the premium is per se illicit. To Judge Friendly, any outgoing
contr6leur, with less than fifty per cent of the stock, offends corporate
democracy in denying the majority the selection of the incoming contr6leur. In inveighing against this "usurpation," he expressed his attitude
toward the premium. "This seems to me a wrong to the corporation and
the other stockholders which the law ought not countenance, whether
the selling stockholder has received a premium or not."69 The inference
is justified that the premium is an additional "wrong to the corporation
and the other shareholders" else why mention it as he did?
Since the premium was $2,000,000 in Essex-more important, a two
dollar premium at six dollar market per share, an impugning ratio-these
reflections of the "opinion" are explicable only as a query: why not also
in Essex? If the premium pointed to an undesirable appointee in Gerdes,
Insuranshares,Benson v. Braun, why not in Essex? Or elsewhere?
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
65 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
66 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
67 Ibid.
68 Id. at 576.
69 Id. at 581.
64
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The answer to these queries lies in a deeper explanation of the nature
and role of the premium76 and another influential distinction.
The Presumptionof Premium Illegality. Judges Lumbard and Friendly
thrashed about in their brush with the premium (they never really did
come to grips with it) because they knew on the one hand that some
premiums were pellucidly illegal-witness Gerdes and the like-yet on
the other they also seemed sure that some were utterly blameless. The fact
is that there are premiums and premiums. Some are bald bribes. Others
may well be one buyer's estimate of a reasonable expenditure necessary
to effect a purchase of a large block of stock without unduly influencing
the market. The point: until the exact nature of a given premium has been
laid bare, no court can proceed to an adjudication on the legality of the
deal and ultimately on the suitability of the appointee.
Even without a present full analysis of the nature of the premium,
this much is clear:
Whenever corporate control is transferred, accompanied by the sale of some
stock, a rebuttable presumption arises that any premium over the market
value is illicit.
At the least, such a premium demands explanation. The explanation may
be readily forthcoming. If so, the bonus was legitimate. But an unexplained premium justifies a conclusion of illegality.
This presumption of premium illegality should have prompted the court
to exact an explanation from Essex and Yates as to the nature of their
$2 million over market.
This presumption, however, must be distinguished from another, even
more important, presumption. Here is the aforementioned influential distinction.
The Premium Presumption of Unsuitability. With the presumption of
premium illegality unrebutted, one can only conclude to an illicit premium. Faced with premium illicity, one is forced to move another step
to another presumption. The presence of an illegal premium points to
possible duplicity in the deal and consequently to an unsuitable appointee.
A reprehensible premium is undeniable evidence of the reprehensibility
of the selection of the new contr6leur.
judge Friendly sensed all this. To him, not only is the premium an evil
in itself and an indicium of unsuitability, but more important it creates
just such a presumption of unsuitability. Judge Friendly's premium-presumption position arose somewhat obiter in his extreme argument banning
all transfers of control by an outgoing contr~leur with less than a major70 ]bid.
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ity-stock-ownership base. He endorsed this blanket prohibition because
the crass tests of legality derived from the looting cases left undetected,
when applied to the majority of cases, the subtly deficient appointee who
nonetheless was legally and substantially unqualified for the office. "To
hold the seller for delinquencies of the new directors only if he [the outgoing contr6leur] knew the purchaser was an intending looter is not a
sufficient sanction. . . . Stronger medicines are needed-refusal to enforce"71 the contract of sale. His baby-with-the-bath solution seemed
necessary because (and here he raises, only to reject, the premium presumption of unsuitability as an alternative) "[t]he difficulties of proof are
formidable even if receipt of too high a premium creates a presumption of
such knowledge.. ."72 Judge Lumbard was also well advised of the impact
of the presence of a premium:
The complaint [in Benson v. Braun], sustained earlier by the Appellate
Division . . . alleged that this premium had been for the immediate transfer of control under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that the
purchasers intended to loot the corporation.73
Judge Friendly's rejected alternative was the correct solution. The
subliminal assumptions of Judges Lumbard and Friendly were correct:
(1) Any premium over market is questionable. At least an explanation is
deserved. (2) An unexplained premium leaves the deal-and the dealers
-suspect.
Here was the last of the five major pitfalls confronting the Essex
court: should this subliminal questioning of the legality of the premium
be carried forward, first, to the formulation of a presumption of premium
illegality, and then, secondly, on to the logical consequence, a premium
presumption of appointee unsuitability? The court of course did not go
quite that far.
Once assumed with Judge Friendly (or even ex arguendo) the suspect
nature of the premium and the question inevitably arises: wherein lies
the turpitude (and hence the later presumption of unsuitability)? The
answer is twofold: (1) an incoming contr6leur who will pay $2,000,000
to Yates, when the money seemingly belongs to the other 71.7 percent
ratably, is at least suspect, if not already convicted of wrongdoing. (At
least the burden of proof lies with the payor-appointee to justify the $2
million extra. Thus a rebuttable presumption of illegality.) (2) Do such
questionable means to gain control excite at least a suspicion of future
71 Ibid.
72 Id. at 578.
73 Bayne, "A Philosophy of Corporate Control," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963); Bayne,

"Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee," 53 Geo. LJ. 543 (1965); Bayne, "The Sale of
Corporate Control," 33 Fordham L. Rev. 583 (1965).
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illegal activity? Is the suspicion sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption? Thus an unrebutted presumption of an illicit premium raises in turn
a rebuttable presumption of an unsuitable appointee?
This presumption of unsuitability is not only founded on the assumption of premium illegality but also on the incoming contr8leur's knowledge of that illegality. As rebuttable, the presumption will fall upon proof
that a high-minded and conscientious appointee was convinced of the
legality of the premium, as he might be in the light of prevailing New
York law. With such proof, the original Lumbard presumption of legality
would reassert itself and the matter would go forward on the simple question of the intrinsic qualifications of the contr6leur appointee, irrespective
of any premium.
This is on the assumption, of course, that the other, lesser indicia of
unsuitability had not otherwise destroyed the presumption of propriety
established by the mere incumbency, legitimate or unchallenged illegitimate, of the contr6leur.
A reflective summary could take the form of a statement of the five
major pitfalls which faced the Second Circuit in Essex Universal: (1)
The distinction between the duty to appoint and the suitability of the
appointee. (2) The legitimacy of an appointment by a mere-incumbency
contr6leur, i.e., without the consent of ownership. (3) The requirement
of majority-ownership approval of the appointment. (4) The equation of
"tantamount to majority" with strict majority approval. (5) The premium presumption of impropriety, based in turn on the unrebutted presumption of the illegality of the premium.
(7) The Adjudication
The major sale-of-control principles underlying Essex Universal should
become more sharply limned by application in a hypothetical adjudication of the case.
The transfer of control, with a concomitant sale of more or less stock,
or without any stock whatsoever, is by no means per se illegal. More to
the point, in the words of Judge Lumbard, the "easy and immediate
transfer of corporate control to new interests is ordinarily beneficial to
the economy" and hence a highly desirable and often necessary method
of installing a new person in the office.
The selection of such successor is governed by the broad fiduciary
duty of control, the bonum commune of corporation and shareholders,
and specifically by the (1) intellectual, (2) moral, (3) managerial, (4)
social and (5) physical norms of appointee suitability.
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Whether the incumbent contr6leur founds his tenure on (1) totalownership appropriation, (2) fifty-plus-per-cent-ownership approval or
(3) tenure by mere incumbency, a rebuttable presumption of propriety
arises, i.e., that the man selected conforms to the fivefold proximate
norm of suitability. This stems from the tenable premise that an unchallenged officeholder is performing his duties in due course and suitably
unless judicially proven otherwise. This premise would encompass his
choice of a new man for his job.
This rebuttable presumption of propriety would indisputably prevail
in Essex Universal, not because of a corporate democratic principle of
majority or equivalent approval of ownership but through mere-incumbency tenure. Herbert Yates had acquiesced in the custody of Republic
Pictures-and, for all the facts, seemingly legitimately-and as a steward
had the right, or at worst the duty, to appoint a successor. Until shown
otherwise one must therefore assume his selection of Essex Universal
Corporation as the new top-policy person was for the best interests of
Republic and in every way good and proper.
Toward the consideration of a possible breach of the five-part proximate norm of suitability, and the resultant rebuttal of the presumption
of propriety of the selection, the facts as adduced reveal none of the
lesser indicia of unsuitability. On remand, however, this matter would
bear inquiry.
The presumption of Essex Universal's suitability for the office of contr~leur falls, however, in the face of the countervailing premium presumption. Essex Universal was prepared to pay $2 million over the
current market to Yates. Such a premium requires explanation. Neither
Yates nor Essex gave one. Such a premium may be perfectly legitimate, or
it may be completely illegal. Whenever control is transferred, accompanied by the sale of some stock, a rebuttable presumption arises that any
money over market is illegal. Until Essex justifies this premium the money
belongs ratably to the other 71.7 percent of the shareholders. Such
questionable means (since unexplained) to gain control consequently
raise a suspicion of future illegal activity counter to the interests of the
71.7 percent; over and above the presumably dubious morality of the payment itself. Such conduct at least puts Essex Universal and Yates to the
proof of (1) The legality of the premium, and (2) The suitability of the
selection.
Since the record reveals an insufficient inquiry into the nature of the
$2 million premium, and the damaging ratio of two dollar premium to six
dollar market per share, as well as the lesser indicia, the district court
on remand will entertain evidence to determine whether the premium in
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fact was to be paid as an illicit inducement to gain appointment to the
office or was a licit payment to Yates, e.g., as a necessary outlay to secure
a large block, or further, whether Essex Universal had knowledge of the
implications of the premium, or saw nothing reprehensible in following
prevailing New York law bona fide. If the evidence satisfactorily shows
that the "premium" was not a premium and that Essex Universal was
acting in good conscience (in short that the presumption of premium
illegality was rebutted), the premium presumption of unsuitability will
also fall, the original presumption of propriety will revest, and Essex
Universal will presumably, absent other reasons to the contrary, assume
the office of contr6leur of Republic Pictures, or receive damages for the
breach, according to the prayer. The court correspondingly will treat the
$2 million according to its findings as to its true nature.
Since the transfer of corporate control with a concomitant sale of stock
is not per se illegal, this defense of per se illegality cannot prevail, and
the summary judgment for Yates should be reversed.
The major question on remand, therefore, is the acceptability of Essex
Universal in the light of the bonum commune of the Republic Corporation
and the fivefold specific norm of appointee suitability, whether, reiterating
Judge Friendly's concern, "control could . . .be safely transferred to
the particular purchaser . . ... 4 With principal adversion, of course,

to the rebuttable presumption of premium illegality and the consequent
premium-presumption of appointee unsuitability.
II
CAPLAN-LIoNEL

The Lionel Corporation, long famous for toy trains and now in
electronics as well, had been the subject of two successive control transfers within a seven-month period in 1963. Roy M. Cohn, later acquitted of
perjury in the United Dye swindle and involved from McCarthy to
Fifth Avenue Coach, controlled six of the eleven directors of Lionel
with less than three per cent ownership.7 5 In early 1963 Cohn agreed to
a deferred sale (no delivery since Cohn had previously pledged the
stock for an earlier indebtedness70 ) with an immediate transfer of control
to Defiance Industries, Inc., a Muscat-Huffines-Krock enterprise. The
price: $280,000 at five and one-half, the existing market.7 7
74 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 573 (2d Cir. 1962).
75

Matter of Caplan (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 24, p. 14, col 3 (Feb. 4,

1964).
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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Seven months later almost to the day, the late A. N. Sonnabend made
a similar deal in turn with Defiance, first at $350,00078 but eventually
$415,000,11 edged up by the inexplicably same Defiance contract with
Gabriel Industries, Inc. at $42 5,00080 (breached, with Sonnabend's indemnification"1 ). Again, the seriatim resignation of the six control directors of Lionel. 2
Two relevant agreements provided that Sonnabend would cause Lionel
to employ three Muscat men for five years at $5,000 per year, 83 and
that Lionel would acquire several Sonnabend companies (e.g., Mad, a
doll manufacturer) in exchange for so much Lionel stock as to increase
Sonnabend's holdings to thirty per cent. 4 The control transfer was again
immediate, but the Cohn stock remained in pledge."
Two separate actions were instituted in the supreme court. The first
at the instance of Hyman Caplan8 sought to set aside the election of
the Sonnabend directors as illegal under the New York Business Corporation Law. Gabriel Industries on the second hand (undoubtedly miffed
by its loss of the battle) brought a derivative action87 to force Defiance
to hand over the $135,000 premium-differential to Lionel.
In the Caplan action, special term opened its argument with the
conclusion that it was "illegal to sell corporate office or management
control by itself (that is, accompanied by no stock or insufficient stock
to carry voting control) " 8 -- a direct quotation of the opening argument
in Essex Universal, again citing the famous McClure v. Law.8" This
central, unqualified holding the appellate division affirmed: "Special
Term found the elections to be illegal and vacated them. With this finding and disposition we are in accord."9 0 The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion 1
In the Gabriel Industries suit special term built on the illegality of
the election as established in Caplan-Lionel and concluded: "Therefore,
Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
78

81

Ibid.

82 Ibid.
83 Id. at cols. 3-4.

84 Id. at col. 4.

85 Ibid.
88 Matter of Caplan (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 24, p. 14, col. 3 (Feb. 4,

1964).

87 Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964), in 151
N.Y.L.J. No. 119, p. 13, col. 8 (June 17, 1964).

88 Matter of Caplan, supra note 86.

89 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
90 Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't 1964).
91 Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
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Defiance, who controlled the management of Lionel, when it illegally sold
such control, must account to Lionel in this action for the illegal profit."9 2
Caplan-Lionel Analyzed
The reasoning and philosophy underlying the Caplan-Lionel litigation
complement admirably the analysis of Essex Universal, and confirm the
synthesis of The Sale of Corporate Control.3 The variations in the
Caplan facts elicit questions-and answers-exactly apropos to a fuller
and deeper corpus of transfer-of-control law.
Repetition of facts and law already laid out in Essex would be otiose.
Caplan builds on the framework of Essex and is beset for the most part
with the same pitfalls as Essex. The approach, therefore, will be a highlight of the differences-improvements or retrogressions-in three notable
areas where Caplan departs from Essex: Mere Incumbency v. Democracy,
The Proximate Norms of Suitability, and The Role of the Premium.
(1) Mere Incumbency v. Democracy
The conclusion is irresistible that the Caplan court first had a deep
visceral sense that the Muscat syndicate breached their fiduciary duty
in appointing Sonnabend and then sought diligently for a rationalization
for ousting him from control. This rationalization is the major departure
from Essex and the undoubted center and foundation of the court's
holding. In the spirit of Essex, Caplanwarmly espoused corporate democracy as the family-doctor specific for any ills and maladies in the transfer
of control. But, departing Essex, Caplan refused to water democracy
'
down by equating "practical voting power"94
with "a mathematical
95
'
majority stock interest." Caplan did not delude itself that the control
held by a 28.3 per cent block was referable to ownership consent, democratic approval, or, least of all, to the strict majority consent of ownership. The Caplan court was vividly conscious-even more so than was
Judge Friendly-that the 28.3 per cent control position of Yates, and a
fortiori the three-per-cent position of the Muscat group, were attributable
to the nondemocratic power of mere incumbency-the broad dispersal
of shares and the solicitation system.
The Caplan court approached its rationalization with a seemingly
wholehearted endorsement of the Essex concept of corporate democracy.
Caplan began, as Essex began, by conditioning the legitimacy of the
transfer on the democratic approval of the appropriators:
92 Gabriel Industries, Inc. v. Defiance Industries, Inc., supra note 87, at col. 8.
93 Bayne, "The Sale of Corporate Control," 33 Fordham L. Rev. 583 (1965).
94 Matter of Caplan (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.YL.J. No. 24, p. 14, cols. 3-4
(Feb. 4, 1964).
95 Ibid.
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"[It] is illegal to sell corporate office or management control by itself (that
is, accompanied by no stock or insufficient stock to carry voting control)"

(Essex Universal ...).96

In Caplan, as in Essex, the court hastened to qualify. In an "actual
transfer of a mathematical majority stock interest ...

or even a lesser

interest that constitutes effective voting control of the corporation (see
Essex Universal... involving 28.3%) it has been held that such transfer
is not per se illegal.1 97 Here, apparently, was the same old Essex syllogism:
It is illegal to sell corporate office without sufficient appropriator approval.
But: A mathematical majority is sufficient appropriator approval.
And: A lesser interest constituting effective control is also sufficient appropriator approval.
The syllogism concluded, as it did in Essex:
In the latter [Essex] case, it was recognized that the block of stock involved [28.3 per cent] 98carried with it the practical voting power to elect a
majority of the board.
On first face, Caplan is subscribing to the Essex thesis that a democratic
majority is latent in "a lesser interest" than a full fifty per cent, that
this 28.3 per cent satisfies the requirements of corporate democracy and
majority-ownership approval as long as it carries "with it the practical
voting power to elect a majority of the board."99
But such an interpretation of Caplan is unfounded. Caplan undoubtedly was attempting to preserve stare decisis by lip service to this
majority without a majority. Faced with the hard fact that the Muscat
three per cent also "carried with it the practical voting power to elect a
majority of the board"' 00 Caplan made no further reference to this
initial equation of 28.3 per cent with "a mathematical majority stock
interest."10 '
Ignoring thenceforward this embarrassing parallel, the court introduced
its own particular resolution of the case, leaving no doubt about its
total allegiance to unmitigated corporate democracy and appropriator
approval.
Underlying the development of such law has been an expanding judicial
awareness of the importance of preserving to the body politic of a corporation, the stockholders, their legal franchise, so vital in any realm of
democracy, to elect representatives of their choosing.' 02

96 Ibid.
97

Ibid.

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.

Ibid.
101 Ibid.
IoD

102 Ibid.
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In support of this broad philosophy Caplan, by direct quotation from
Essex, adduced the same two unrelated principles of "corporate democracy": (1) the contr6leur must act "on behalf of" and "represent" the
corporation and the stockholders, and (2) the contr6leur must "be chosen
by, or at least with the consent of, those who own the corporation.""0 3
Caplan, as Essex, made no adversion to the custodial relation, as the
foundation of the contr6leur's fiduciary duty, inchoate in this statement.
Caplan merely concluded that "these fundamental principles of corporate democracy . . . dictate that the resignation of the Defiance
directors and their replacement with the designees of Sonnabend . . .
were, under the circumstances herein, illegal in this case."1 °4 Without
hedging or qualifying, Caplanbased the legitimacy-here the illegitimacy
-of the Sonnabend appointment solely on the grounds of corporate
democracy and strict majority-ownership approval, without the dilution
of an "equivalent" power.
Caplandid make a fainthearted attempt to distinguish Essex by noting
the absence of an actual stock transfer. But Caplan knew too well that
the facts in Caplan were on all fours with the facts in Essex. Hence the
court's conclusion constituted an implicit, if not explicit, repudiation of
the Essex "majority without a majority."
Even assuming that some sale or transfer of such stock could be imputed
in the transaction, certainly this 3 per cent of the stock cannot be considered
as carrying with it the power to elect management of the corporation. 10 5
Which, of course, could be said similarly of the 28.3 per cent in Essex.
To its credit, the Caplan court, once embarked on the corporatedemocracy premise, was perfectly logical in its conclusion. When control
is based strictly on a democratic vote, nothing less than fifty-plus
per cent can "be considered as carrying with it the power to elect management of the corporation."
An interesting obiter. Both the Caplan and Essex courts reached the
correct conclusion, but for the wrong reasons. Essex knew that the
appointment of Essex Universal as contr6leur was not per se illegal, but
it also knew that the suspicious $2,000,000 premium called for further
inquiry on remand. Essex also espoused majority-ownership corporate
democracy. But bald application of corporate democracy would invalidate the Essex Universal appointment. So Essex hedged and called
the 28.3 per cent "equivalent" to a majority. Thus the appointment was
not per se illegal. The defense of illegality failed. Hence a remand.
103 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
104 Matter of Caplan (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.LJ. No. 24, p. 14, cols. 3-5
(Feb. 4, 1964).
105 Id. at col 5.
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Caplan concluded that the selection of Sonnabend was improper. Here
the bald application of corporate democracy-without reference to a
"majority without a majority"--rendered the contract illegal. This made
it simple for the Caplan court.
Yet the Caplan court had more than a suspicion that the democraticmajority approval was not the sole legitimate foundation for control
tenure. It felt in its bones that the real reason for Sonnabend's unsuitability was otherwise.
Mere-incumbency Control. The discussion of control tenure by mere
incumbency began with a statement that might well have been the keynote of this entire study:
The then prime concern of the court becomes an aspect of the corporate
democratic process which has not yet been fully explored by judicial
determination or regulatory provision, that of control of the mechanics
and machinery of proxy solicitation and the corporate funds utilized therefor by the present incumbents of the board of directors. 1 6
The entire Caplan opinion is shot through with the realization that
control by mere incumbency is completely nondemocratic and founded
on the dispersal of shares and the solicitation system.
The court first tipped its hand with a quotation from Judge Friendly,
the quotation in which he warned that stockholders would occasionally
"have no voice as to [the contr6leur's] . . . immediate successor."' 0 7 In
this statement Judge Friendly related the choice to the contr6leur's
fiduciary responsibility.
Further, the Caplan court knew well that the Muscat group related
its control to mere incumbency alone, had in fact "the power to elect
management of the corporation" without reliance on any stock ownership at all. The detailed discussion of the mechanics of mere-incumbency
control make this clear:
The court is cognizant of the fact that the content and method of distribution of the proxy material is subject to the regulation and control of the
Securities and Exchange Commission .... Within such limits, there is no
doubt that full disclosure... will be required to be made of all the pertinent
and relevant factors with respect to the contemplated action to be taken ....
But such rules and regulations still leave with present management the
physical modus operandi of such solicitation and the corporate funds
necessary to operate it.108
Query why Caplan did not carry this realization forward to the legitimacy
of mere-incumbency tenure. Why not the same respect and recognition
-granted the present corporate dispensation-accorded majority-owner106 Id. at col. 6.
107 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 103, at 581.
108 Matter of Caplan, supra note 104, at col. 6.
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ship control or control founded on total-ownership appropriation. The
reductio ad absurdum would seem to illegitimate any transfer of control
of A.T. & T., U.S. Steel, or General Motors.
The System Impugned. Probably the most revealing insight lay in the
attack on the present-day, nondemocratic system of contrbleur selection.
At no time did the court state directly that the A.T.&T.-type, mereincumbency tenure was per se illegal. But it effectively disavowed the
system-and the tenure in consequence-by categorically blocking its
operation at the crucial point in Caplan. Its reason:
The solicitation material will undoubtedly propose the election of a
slate perpetuating in office the very directors whom [sic] this court has held
were illegally elected. 109
Clearly an "election" by the shareholders would rubber-stamp the same
Sonnabend board already appointed by the seriatim resignation of the
Muscat group. Painfully Caplan saw no democracy whatsoever in such
an election.
Frustrated, the court attempted to emasculate the mere-incumbency
formula by refusing to permit the submission of the matter to the
shareholders.
[S] ome restrictions on the present board are required, so that the Sonnabend
group may not take advantage of the position they hold. They shall be
restricted to current management problems ...

and ...

they shall not be

permitted to use their present offices as the means to secure stockholder

approval for the designated directorial slate .... 110

The court was convinced that:
the interests of all of the corporate body politic require that some method
be evolved so that the holders of the other 97 per cent of the corporate stock
be given an opportunity to express and disseminate their views and suggestions and take whatever appropriate action they wish to with respect to both
the future management of the corporation and the acquisition proposals
which are about to be submitted to them."1
Once committed to this inherent distrust of the system, Caplan
shifted about uncertainly.
In other words, what is called for is some neutralizing element which will
see to it that no undue advantage is arrogated to it by the current group
and that other groups, which may form, will have an opportunity to take
such action in the premises as they deem advisable.12
But the court could come forward with no substitute, no solution to the
present-day corporate predicament which would permit corporate democ109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
M1iIbid.
112 Ibid.
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racy to operate successfully in the face of the wide dispersal of shares
and the solicitation system. So it determined pragmatically on a referee
who would "perform such acts as may be necessary to effectuate the
decision of the court."'1 The referee forbade incumbent management
to use corporate funds, personnel, and solicitation materials, to propose
a slate of directors, or in any way to engage in the customary management
activities toward the election of a new board.
All this, however, did not lead the court to an approbation of the nondemocratic selection of the contr6leur by incumbent management. Caplan
was loath to admit that the heart of the matter was the suitability of
the appointee, not-at least here-the right to make the appointment.
Yet much in the opinion points to a suspicion that the ultimate question
was the suitability of the selectee.
(2) The Proximate Norms of Suitability
Again the Caplan court was perfectly logical. Once it subscribed to
the strict majority-ownership premise, further discussion was superfluous.
The three-per-cent holding of Sonnabend-or even the 28.3 of Essexwas far from "sufficient stock to carry voting control." The conclusion
was foregone-the Sonnabend appointment was illegal. Without the
right to appoint, there is no need to consider suitability. "The calibre of
the particular designees of Sonnabend

...

is irrelevant to the issue pre-

sented here."-"4
As final and conclusive as this was, the court nonetheless proceeded
to a general discussion of suitability.
The three directors of Lionel who remained on the Board during successive
changeovers to Defiance and then to the Sonnabend group stated categorically that they believed that the Sonnabend management was not only
able but necessary for the survival of Lionel .... "I
Had the Caplan court reasoned to suitability as the key question,
undoubtedly it would have moved from this broad statement to the five
elements adduced earlier in this study. Caplan, however, was consistent
to the end.
It may well be that such individuals are well qualified to act and serve the
best interests of the corporation. This court need not pass judgment thereon.
The trouble is that the method by which they assumed office effectively
disenfranchised the holders of the other 97 per cent of the outstanding stock
of the corporation, contrary to law. In no sense can this disregard of the
rights of stockholders be justified by the rectitude of the illegally elected
directors." 6
1'8 Ibid.
114

Id. at col. 5.

15 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
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Indicia of Breach

Seemingly the court thus concedes the moral "rectitude of the illegally
elected directors" but elsewhere appear three distinct indications of the
possible unacceptability of Sonnabend.
Self-Serving Contracts. When the chips were down, the court was not
too sure of the Sonnabend group.
Therefore, some restrictions of the present Board are required, so that the
Sonnabend group may not take advantage of the position they hold. They
shall be restricted to current management problems and other matters
necessary for the proper functioning of the corporation and they shall not be
permitted to use their present offices as the means to secure stockholder
approval for their designated directorial slate, or dealing [sic] in matters
involving self interest, such as proposed acquisitions from [Sonnabend's]
Premier Corporation of America. i" 7
These Sonnabend deals parallel the self-serving steel contracts of the
Wilport syndicate in Perlman v. Feldmann."' Any acquisitions increasing the Sonnabend holdings from three to thirty per cent suggest close
scrutiny by the court.
Unjustified Salaries and Fees. In "matters involving self interest" the
court might well have included the $75,000 payable by Lionel to the
departing Muscat group. These salaries may have been justifiable but
certainly warrant inquiry on the trial level.
The third indicium, the $135,000 premium (beyond the $75,000
salaries), deserved and received considerable attention throughout.
(4) The Role of the Premium
Only a prejudiced reading could ascribe to Caplan insights superior
to Essex in an understanding of the role of the premium. At best the
Caplan court had a lurking sense that various premiums had various implications. That some were the expected saving in the purchase of a large
block of stock. That other premiums were outright bribes. That many
variants lay between markup and bribe. Conceivably Justice Korn envisaged such a reasonable bonus when he remarked: "[C]ontrol stock
may command a price in excess of that payable for other shares of the
corporation ... ."119

Further reading reveals that this undefined and unspecified bonus
is apparently altogether different from another kind of premium which
must "be returned to the corporation. . .

"

This premium is illegiti-

mate. The court specifies two kinds: (1) that premium paid to "controlId. at col. 6.
219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
119 Matter of Caplan (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 24, p. 14, cols. 3-4
(Feb. 4, 1964).
117
118
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ling stockholders" who are "transferring office to persons who are known
or should be known as intending to raid the corporate treasury or otherwise improperly benefit themselves ....2"12 and (2) that "bonus or
premium specifically in consideration of their agreement to resign and
install the designees of the purchaser of their stock, above and beyond
the price premium normally attributable to the control stock being
sold ....;21
This latter instance is fundamentally indistinguishable from Judge
Lumbard's "bare sale of office"'122 and Judge Clark's "naked transfer of
corporate office."'n
Nevertheless, successive contracts to assign this agreement for $350,000
and $425,000 and the ultimate sale for $415,000 clearly establish that the
premium price was being paid for the accompanying transfer of managerial
control that was the all important emolument of the transaction. In fact,
what occurred here was the mere sale and purchase of naked directorial
control, without any accompanying sale or transfer of control stock, in
violation of the clear mandate of McClure v. Law .. . .124
The court does not spell out the differences among the classes, good and
bad, of Caplan premiums. Nevertheless in the latter class "any bonus
received for such transfer of their office [must] be returned to the corporation .... )15
In spite of repeated recurrence to the differences among premiums, one
cannot be sure how fully the court appreciated them. It first accepts the
general legitimacy of one class of premium, undoubtedly in deference to
New York law. But later it recognizes the premium-and here who can
say what kind of premium is involved, or all kinds?-as an indicium of
wrong, by quoting Judge Friendly. "'This seems to me a wrong to the
corporation and the other stockholders which the law ought not countenance, whether the selling stockholder has received a premium or not.' ,1n26
Again the court returned to the illegitimacy of the premium, ("Clearly,
such power alone was the commodity here being bartered to the highest
bidder in the market place ' 12 7) but never did the court carry through to
the logical implications of the illegality of a premium.
As with Essex, the Caplancourt never faced up to the premium issue at
all. Just when it seemed that the court was going to ascribe "such trans120 1bid.
121 Ibid.
122 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 577 (2d Cir. 1962).
12-3 Id. at 580.
124

Matter of Caplan, supra note 119, at col. 5.

125 Id. at col. 4.
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gressions" (which is what the various premium deals were called) to the
appointee and conclude to his unsuitability, the matter was dropped.
Only from the biased viewpoint of the Essex analysis can one maintain that the Caplan court had an inkling "that the premium price ...
being paid for the accompanying transfer'112 was in cold fact its major
reason for the illegality of the election of the Sonnabend designees.
Rather, the decision was founded on the philosophy of corporate democracy and the denial of the franchise to the appropriators.
(5) The Adjudication
The Muscat control position has been unchallenged and nothing indicates that it was wrested by duress, fraud, or other illegal means from
Cohn. This tenure is founded on mere incumbency-share dispersal and
domination of the proxy statement-and in no way on majority ownership or democratic approval. Since such A.T.&T.-type control is not per
se illegal, the right and duty to appoint a successor vests in the incumbent
contrbleur.
On the premise that an officeholder is performing properly until proven
otherwise, a presumption of the propriety of the Sonnabend appointment
by Muscat immediately arises. Shareholder Caplan, therefore, as the
attacking dissident, must show the unsuitability of Sonnabend in the light
of the fivefold norm.
Toward this end Caplan adduced the $135,000 premium that Sonnabend was prepared to pay wholly to the Muscat men rather than prorate it
over the other ninety-seven per cent of the owners. This payment raises
on its part a countervailing presumption (rebuttable, true, but at least
demanding an explanation) of illegality. As unexplained (and the facts
presage slight success at explanation) the illegal premium induces in
turn a presumption of impropriety in the appointment which adequately
destroys the incumbency presumption of propriety and concludes to appointee suitability.
Two lesser indicia of Sonnabend unacceptability were advanced by
Caplan. Sonnabend had already committed Lionel to $75,000 (over the
$135,000 premium) for future Muscat consultative services. Sonnabend
had further committed Lionel to purchase several Sonnabend companies
with Lionel stock, thereby increasing his holdings from three to thirty
per cent.
The presence of the major premium presumption and the two lesser
indicia of unsuitability throws the burden back on Sonnabend. The pre128
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sumption at this point: Sonnabend does not have the best interests of
Lionel at heart and is unfit for the complete custody of the company.
Sonnabend should have been given full opportunity to explain. Conceivably he was genuinely convinced-as New York law has been-that
the $135,000 truly belonged to Muscat alone and not to the ninety-seven
per cent. Possibly it really did. Sonnabend could possibly establish the
legitimacy of (a) the salaries and (b) the corporate acquisitions. With
this, his general desirability would seem to be proven, barring any further
character deficiencies.
On the assumption, however, that all relevant evidence has been before
the court, Sonnabend's unsuitability for the office has been established. He
and his designees must be removed and the $135,000 premium restored to
Lionel (as it was in fact in the Gabriel-Lionel 9 litigation) on the tenable
assumption that the premium was far out of line as a justified bonus for a
large (three per cent?) block of stock.
The parallel of Caplan with Essex is almost perfect. On remand in
Essex, Essex Universal faced the necessity of rebutting the presumptions
established by the $2 million premium. Essex Universal, however; did
not face any further indicia of unsuitability. Since 28.3 and three per cent
differ neither practically (except for a bigger solicitation base) nor
theoretically, the only distinction between Caplan and Essex is the absence of the two lesser indicia of unsuitability. Assuming the failure of
Essex Universal and Sonnabend to rebut the premium presumption, the
result is the same in both cases.
The holding in Caplan should be founded on the reasoning of the
hypothetical adjudication of Essex Universal v. Yates.
III
REPUBLIC

Juxtaposed against Caplan-Lionel is another Muscat venture. This
time however, at least at special term and in appellate division, 1 0 the
Muscateers drew blood.
The parallel with Lionel, with one alleged and one patent exception, is
pat. In early 1963 the elder William Zeckendorf controlled six of the
eleven directors of the Republic Corporation (the onetime Republic
Pictures [of Essex Universal v. Yates] now diversified into appliances)
with slightly less than ten per cent of the common." 1 In July 1963, the
129 Gabriel Industries, Inc. v. Defiance Industries, Inc. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151
N.Y.L.J. No. 119, p. 13, col. 8 (June 17, 1964).
180 Matter of Carter (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.LJ. No. 103, p. 17, col. 1 (May
26, 1964), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st Dep't 1964).
181 Id. at col. 1.
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B.S.F. Corporation (an investment company controlled by the MuscatHuffines-Krock Defiance Industries, Inc.) 13 agreed to buy the Zeckendorf interests.'
The result: the seriatim substitution of six B.S.F.
nominees. 4On the day following, B.S.F. paid the market price and took
3
delivery.1
Victor M. Carter, the theretofore president of Republic and owner
of nearly five per cent of the common, initiated action in the supreme
court. Relying fully on Caplan-Lionel,he sought to set aside the election
as illegal "since it did not take place in connection with the sale of either
a majority of the stock of Republic or of such a percentage as gives
working control . .. 2,"
Full in the face of Caplan, special term sustained the legality of the
election "in view of the vastly different facts involved ... ,,"36 The fact
that was "vastly different" was the actual transferral of the stock in
Republic. In Caplan the Cohn control package remained in pledge.
Special term quoted Caplan, appellate division:
"The underlying principle is that the management of a corporation is not
the subject of trade and cannot be bought apart from actual stock control .... Where there has been a transfer of the majority of the stock or
even such percentage as gives working control, a change of directors by
resignation and filling of vacancies is proper (Citations omitted)" (Emphasis added) .137
Special term did note, moreover, that in Caplan "the price paid was one
and one-half times the market value of the stock . . ,,'1 "Here, the
purchase price was substantially the same as the market price; there was
no premium paid for control . . . ."I The court also pointed out that
B.S.F. had later purchased sufficient Republic stock to hold approximately twelve per cent of the outstanding common. 140
Republic Analyzed
When considered within the pattern of Essex Universal and Caplan,
the Republic case is readily intelligible and not outstandingly distinctive,
but nonetheless does offer another context for the expansion and deeper
understanding of the law of corporate control.
Unnecessarily fearful of the obvious parallel with Essex Universal and
132 Brown, "What's in It for Eddie, Bob, and -Vc?" Fortune, Sept. 1964, p. 139.
133 Matter of Carter, supra note 130 at col. 1.
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Caplan, the Republic court, by Justice Korn, sought refuge in an immaterial distinction. Throughout the opinion, Justice Korn referred to
the fact that "[A] t no time, from the inception of the Cohn transaction
to the present was there any actual sale or transfer by Cohn of his
Lionel stock. ... "141 The court seemingly felt that the legitimacy of the
transfer of control hung on the physical "delivery of the 237,698 shares
of stock."' 42 Whether the stock is placed in escrow, in a voting trust,
subject to a pledge agreement, or handed over at the time of the appointment of a successor contr6leur, would seem, without more, to have no
relevancy to the effectiveness of the transfer of control or its legitimacy.
In spite of the labored "actual transfer" distinction, a reading of the
Republic opinion leads one to believe that the court in fact placed the true
bases for its holding elsewhere. The following analysis will proceed on this
assumption.
Although the Republic holding faced most of the problems of Essex
Universal and Caplan, two major pitfalls lay in the court's path: the
failure to distinguish (1) the right to appoint from the suitability of the
appointee, and (2) corporate democratic from mere-incumbency tenure.
(1)

CorporateDemocracy v. Mere Incumbency

With Republic thus distinguished from Caplan on "the vastly different
facts" of an actual transfer of stock, the Republic court proceeded to
treat the Caplanreasoning as if this distinction was not pertinent, which,
of course, it was not. To his later chagrin, Justice Korn then embraced
fully the control philosophy underlying the Caplan holding.
As noted earlier, Mr. Justice Steuer stated . . . [In Caplan, Appellate
Division] that a change of directors by resignation and filling of vacancies
is proper where there has been either 1) a transfer of the majority of the
stock, or 2) a transfer of such a percentage of stock as gives working
control .... 143
Here exactly is the lineal descendant of the original Essex Universal
syllogism, repeated in Caplan,which so succinctly expressed the corporate
democratic principles of those two cases.
Although the terminology has been diluted-nowhere in -the opinion
do the words "corporate democracy" appear-and the sharp lines of the
philosophy have been somewhat blurred, the Republic opinion has in
effect merely paraphrased those controlling words of Judge Lumbard,
exactly expressive of the Essex Universal philosophy:
141 Id.
142 Id.
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Such stock voting control would incontestably belong to the owner of a
majority of the voting stock, and it is commonly known that equivalent
power usually accrues to the owner of 28.3% of the stock.1 44
At no point does the Republic court openly postulate a fifty-plusper-cent majority ownership as the sole requisite for the legitimacy of the
control transfer, but the postulate was there, with the same implicit
assertion that less than fifty per cent may still "be equivalent to ownership of a majority of the stock .... ,,145
The dual requisites of the Caplan rule, namely, 1) a transfer of 2) majority
or working control were both lacking in that 146
case, but have both been
satisfied in the case presently before this court.
Not only did Justice Korn demand the democratic approval of a fifty14
plus-per-cent majority-or what "is usually tantamount to majority' 7
approval-but he was convinced that his demand was met.
(2)

Majority Without a Majority

But how? The Republic court faced exactly the same problem of
reconciliation as did the Second Circuit in Essex Universal. Here the
percentage was 9.7; there it was 28.3. In neither case could legal
legerdemain transform 28.3 or 9.7 into a fifty-plus democratic majority.
The answer: the strategem of Judges Lumbard and Clark in Essex
Universal. "Here, there was a transfer of a block of stock which had
historically, since 1961, carried with it actual control of Republic corporation."' 4 8 (Since Republic Pictures Corporation of Essex Universal was
the legitimate progenitor of Republic Corporation, Justice Korn could
have carried his history back even further, since less than fifty per cent
carried actual control in the days of Mr. Yates and his transfer of control
to Essex Universal.) The Republic court expatiated on the point:
The subject block of stock carried with it control of the corporation when
Carter held it in 1961, and it carried with it control when sold by him to
the America Corporation, and each successive transfer of this block of stock
thereafter carried with it the requisite "working control." It cannot hereon
be urged, therefore, without any historical or factual basis, that such block
of stock, which has now been increased
to 12 per cent, does not constitute
149
working or actual stock control.
At this point, the absence of an actual transfer in Caplan becomes a
helpful distinction, because justice Korn was conscious that 9.'7 per cent
144

Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).

145 Id. at 579.

146 Matter of Carter (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) in 151 N.YJL.J. No. 103, p. 17, cols. 1, 3
(May 26, 1964).
147 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 144, at 579.
148 Matter of Carter, supra note 146.
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-or even twelve per cent-was distinguishable only with difficulty from

the three per cent of Caplan. Justice Korn was further aware that everything he said about the history of control of the Republic Corporation
could be said equally of Lionel. Before the Muscat-controlled Defiance In-

dustries sold control to Mr. Sonnabend, Roy Cohn in turn held only the
minimal three per cent. Thus in all three cases, Essex Universal, Caplan,

Republic, the percentages-28.3, three, 9.7, or twelve-were reducibly
and effectively identical.
The Republic court, then, faced a dilemma: follow the Caplan reasoning, since 9.7 was parlously close to three per cent, and declare the
transfer illegitimate as repugnant to corporate democracy. Or, on the
other hand, support Essex Universal and equate the twelve per cent, or
even the 9.7, with a fifty-plus-per cent majority.
The court obviously chose the latter, supported, moreover, by the
"actual transfer" distinction.
(3) Mere-Incumbency Control
Quite clearly, as in Essex Universal and Caplan, not even a smidgen of
corporate democracy, either majority or otherwise, was present in
Republic. In all three, control tenure was achieved by mere incumbency:
(1) the wide dispersal of shares and (2) the proxy-solicitation system.
True, each block of 28.3, 9.7, or twelve, and three per cent, "carried with
it actual control"' 5 0 but this control was not founded on the majority
approval of corporate democracy but on the domination of the proxy
statement 'by incumbent management. One could conjecture that subliminally Justice Korn knew full well this truth. In fact, so subtly is 9.7
per cent equated with a fifty-plus per cent majority, one forgets that the
court is subscribing completely to the corporate democracy of Essex
Universal. Further, the Republic opinion must be read in the light of
Essex Universal and Caplan,else the conclusion would be irresistible that
control tenure by mere incumbency was being accorded full legitimacy.
(4) The ProximateNorms of Suitability
If all the conjectures and subliminal holdings have been justified, the
consequent and most logical imputation of all would be the last: that
the Republic court formally based its opinion-apart from the transfer
ploy-on a specious democratic majority, but actually founded the legitimacy of Zeckendorf's appointment on the acceptability of the Muscatdominated B.S.F. for the control of Republic Corporation. Such conjecture would explain the remainder of the opinion.
150 Ibid.
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Although the court did not discuss directly the overall fiduciary duty
of the bonum commune of the corporation, or the contr~leur's subobligation to select competent personnel, particularly his successor, the qualifications of B.S.F. for the job figured so prominently as to suggest that
the conjectures were justified.
[Tlhe petition and supporting affidavits are devoid of any showing of impropriety in the election of the individual respondents as directors of
Republic ....
151
Yet earlier the court had tacitly disavowed any concern with B.S.F.'s
suitability:
In their brief ... petitioners state that "We are not trying in this action
whether the respondents should be removed for cause, but solely whether
their election on July 11, 1963, was legal, under the Caplan case."' 52
In spite of this disavowal, the Republic court went forward with this
question of removal for cause, and the possibility of a breach of duty in
appointing B.S.F.
(5) Indicia of Breach
The court was far from according a presumption of unsuitability to
the presence of an unexplained (and hence presumptively, albeit rebuttably, illicit) premium, but in this particular Justice Korn joined the
Caplan court in a realization that a premium pointed to something awry.
He related such premium to an illicit transfer.
Moreover, in [Caplan] ...the price paid was one and one-half times the
market value of the stock on which an option was acquired, and such fact
clearly established that the "premium price was being paid for the accompanying transfer of managerial control that was the all important emolument of the transaction. In fact, what occurred here was the mere sale and
purchase of naked directorial
control, without any accompanying sale or
53
transfer of control stock.'1

With this groundwork, the Republic court distinguished the Republic
facts from Caplan with a genuine and controlling distinction. Here, in
fact, is the principal reason why the holding in Republic should and does
go contra to Caplan. "Here, the purchase price was substantially the same
as the market price; there was no premium paid for control .....1"
Justice Korn could not be interpreted as reasserting the Gabriel-Caplan
premium illegality, since no premium was present, but his emphatic
averment of its absence bespeaks his estimate of its importance.
151
152
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The presumption of propriety, therefore, attendant on an appointment
by a legitimate incumbent remained standing. Neither a presumption of
premium illegality nor a consequent premium presumption of appointee
unsuitability were present.
Throughout the opinion the Republic court adverted to lesser indicia of
unsuitability. (1) The possibility of self-serving salary contracts. "It
further appears that the directors have voted three of the new group
salaries of $15,000 each .. . ."' Nothing reprehensible appears on the
face of such action. Justice Korn correctly dropped the matter. (2) Stock
options to the incoming contrbleur. The directors of Republic had voted
options to the three principal Muscat men. This .again, without more,
would seem to invite no animadversion. (3) Prospective damage to the
entity. Midway in its opinion the court cited this major indication of
B.S.F.'s moral integrity:
[T]he petition and supporting affidavits are devoid of any showing of
•.. harm done to, or damage sustained by, the corporate respondent, the
interests of which petitioners claim they are seeking to protect.' 58
Here was negative evidence that B.S.F. had at heart the best interests of
the Republic Corporation.
The absence of the premium-and the consequent presumptions-and
the absence of any lesser indicia of appointee unsuitability remove any
last question of the legitimacy of the B.S.F. appointment. At least on the
facts adduced.
(6)

The Adjudication

Since William Zeckendorf, Sr., held unchallenged (hence presumptively
legitimate) control of the Republic Corporation, his appointment of the
B.S.F. Corporation to succeed himself enjoys a presumption of propriety,
on the premise that an incumbent is performing his duties satisfactorily
until proven otherwise.
The right to appoint in the beginning is founded on the legitimacy of the
nondemocratic, mere-incumbency control tenure. In no wise did it depend
on the specious equation of 9.7 or twelve per cent with a strict fifty-plusper-cent democratic majority.
A countervailing presumption of impropriety did not arise, since no
premium, at least on the record, passed from B.S.F. to Zeckendorf. The
crux of the matter, therefore, became an inquiry into the general suitability of B.S.F.
155 Id. cols. 1-2.

256 Id. col. 2.
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On the assumption of complete facts in the opinion of special term, the
appointment of the B.S.F. Corporation as the contr8leur of Republic
Corporation was in all respects legitimate.
The absence of a premium essentially distinguishes Republic from both
Essex Universal and Caplan.
The ad hoc analyses of Essex Universal, Caplan-Lionel, and Republic
have thus elicited a rather substantial set of rules1 which should go far
toward dispelling "the doubts and questions" which disturbed the Second
Circuit in Essex Universal. In each case the conclusion reached was
correct, but to all three courts, it could be said with Thomas to the
Tempters:
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.
157 For an instance of these rules in practical operation, see Bayne and Johnson, A Legitimate Sale of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, - (1965).

